The 2007-2009 global fi nancial turmoil was exacerbated by a low level of fi nancial market regulatory coordination. Historical experience has shown that despite implementing regulations, supervision and macroeconomic policies, the fi nancial industry regularly experiences crises. Consequently, a similar impact might be expected from the Basel III new bank regulatory framework. The aim of this paper is two-fold; in the fi rst part dedicated to theory we describe the Basel III regulatory standards and argue that this regulation is not suffi cient and will not prevent fi nancial markets from experiencing future crises. Moreover, we discuss implementation of new banking regulation in Europe: the Capital Requirements Directive IV and stricter capital requirements for European banks set by the European Banking Authority in 2011. In the second part, we focus on an empirical analysis of the impact of stricter capital requirements as defi ned in the Basel III framework on the market value of European banks. Our analysis employs the fi xed effects methodology on the fi nancial data collected from 172 banks listed on European stock exchanges during the 2005-2011 period. We conclude that the impact of the Basel III regulation on the value of bank shares will probably be perceived negatively by the market, which could be refl ected in a drop in the market value of the observed banks.
Introduction
Poor design and a low level of international coordination of fi nancial market regulations contributed signifi cantly to the 2007-2009 global fi nancial turmoil. In addition, the pending Eurozone crisis has highlighted the role of bank regulation and its impact on economies. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) argue that regulation, surveillance and sound macroeconomic policy do not suffi ce to prevent crises based on historical experience. A similar impact might be expected from the new regulatory framework on bank capital requirements defi ned by Basel III accords proposed by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS).
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, in the theoretical part we discuss current, new banking regulations in Europe. Second, in the empirical part we analyse the possible impact of stricter capital requirements defi ned in the Basel III framework on the market value of European banks. To our best knowledge, there are no other studies that quantitatively analyse the potential impact of Basel III on the market value of banks. The paper continues as follows: in Section 2 we describe Basel III regulatory standards and argue that this regulation is not suffi cient and will not prevent fi nancial markets from experiencing future crises. Moreover, we discuss the current regulatory framework in Europe, the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and stricter capital requirements for European banks set by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2011. Section 3 presents the model and a related literature review.
In Section 4, we analyse how investors investing into listed European banks would react to the stricter capital requirements under Basel III and which drivers are decisive for their judgments that, in turn, infl uence the market value of listed banks. Put it differently, we will test a hypothesis measuring whether the market would perceive higher capital requirements, lower risk taking and expected less risky balance sheets of banks under the Basel III proposal positively. For this purpose, we will conduct a panel data analysis for 172 European banks listed on European stock exchanges during the 2005-2011 period and employ the fi xed effects methodology. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions and states fi nal remarks.
Basel III and Banking Regulation in the European Union
This section consists of three main parts. The fi rst part provides a theoretical background of fi nancial market regulation. The second part deals with the Basel III regulation with a primary focus on stricter capital requirements. Finally, in the last part we discuss implementation of the new banking regulation in Europe.
Theoretical background of fi nancial market regulation
There is currently pending a fi erce debate about fi nancial market regulation -its classical works include Stigler (1971) , Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) , Goodhart et al. (1998) , Dvořák (2005) or more recently Acharya et al. (2010) , Mandel and Tomšík (2011) , Musílek (2011) or Revenda et al. (2012) . On the one hand, there are logical points of view that higher capital requirements lead to (i) the healthier fi nancial system through decreased risk of potential bank bankruptcies, (ii) lower systemic risk, and (iii) lower social costs as a result of the elimination of moral hazard, while these positives PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2, 2014  145 will substantially trade off any (if any) negative impacts of stricter capital rules. On the other hand, the counter arguments emphasize that higher capital requirements increase the costs of fi nancing for banks (equity fi nancing is relatively more expensive than debt fi nancing), which would lead to (i) the slowdown of the loan growth and potential detrimental effects on the economies, and (ii) the decrease in profi tability disabling future building of capital via retained earnings and eliminating future expansion of bank operations (Cosimano and Hakura, 2011). 1 In this context, theories dealing with the effi ciency of fi nancial market regulation should be reviewed. For instance, Acharya et al. (2010) presents a few fundamental questions regarding this topic. First, we know that excessive regulation involves costs, but what are they? Second, we also know that in the presence of regulation, an unleashed disaster can be observed ex-post only. It implies that optimal regulation should be the art of balancing the immeasurable against the unknowable. As a result, effective fi nancial market regulation is basically a "mission impossible" and recurring crises can be still expected in the future. Šinka and Teplý (2011) developed a regulation theory called "MAC questions in regulation". This theory raises three fundamental questions for regulators when regulating any industry or entity: i) Materiality (key questions: Are activities of a newly regulated entity material and signifi cant? Does this future regulated entity play a signifi cant role on the relevant market?); ii) Accountability (key questions: Is the regulated entity accountable, can the regulator identify it and perform effective regulation and supervision?); and fi nally iii) Credibility (key questions: How successful were similar regulations? Does any applicable best-practice regulation exist?). Effective regulation and supervision (i.e. expected benefi ts outweigh related costs) requires positive answers to all three questions. Šinka and Teplý (2011) demonstrate that both hedge fund and private equity regulation fail to give a positive answer to any of the questions and that these regulations are ineffective, which corresponds with reality.
Alternatively, Teplý et al. (2012) present a theoretical concept "5Gs of Effective Regulation" and discusses 5 guarantees (Gs) for achieving global effective regulation 2 : i) guarantee of strong supervisor (powerful and independent), ii) guarantee of international coordination (the supervisor should act globally), iii) guarantee of risk coverage (simple and easy capital ratios and risk management indicators of credit, market, liquidity, operational and systemic risks, stress tests, shocks absorption buffers etc.), iv) guarantee of bank crisis management (adequate bankruptcy law, crisis resolution, deposit insurance, recapitalization rules etc.), and fi nally v) guarantee of personal responsibility (regulators should have personal responsibility and adequate remuneration, which does not hold in practice, however). Teplý et al. (2012) conclude that the 5Gs are not simultaneously achievable, so there is a challenge to implementing 1
For a detailed theoretical discussion about arguments supporting and criticizing Basel III rules and an empirical verifi cation of some of them, see Šútorová (2012) or Klinger and Teplý (2014) .
2
Effective regulation in this context means that benefi ts of regulatory rules outweigh the related costs. i.e. the similar defi nition applied in Šinka and Teplý (2011). effective regulation. As a result, global regulatory efforts will not prevent fi nancial markets from future crises and fi nancial upheavals, which correspond to the fi ndings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) or Reihart and Rogoff (2009) or Acharya et al. (2010) .
Basel III background
The overall objective of Basel III is to strengthen global capital, liquidity and risk assessment rules to ensure a higher level of resiliency in the banking sector. The reason for changing and complementing preceding rules (Basel II 3 ) was to prevent the consequences of market failures revealed by the crisis by improving the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from fi nancial and economic stresses (BCBS, 2010) . The main channels for accomplishing these goals include increasing the quantity and enhancing the quality of capital, enhancing risk coverage and introducing liquidity requirements. All of the measurements are supported by defi ning more tight and precise market discipline and supervision (BCBS, 2011b) . Despite the fact that Basel III should mean an improvement compared to Basel II capital accords, we agree with Teplý et al. (2012) who state that the Basel III regulation is not suffi cient and will not prevent fi nancial markets from future crises due to its expected calibration, delayed implementation and strong pressure from bank lobbyists.
Since this paper focuses primarily on the higher capital requirements set by Basel III, we will discuss this topic in more detail. As described in BCBS (2010), Basel III distinguishes two main types of capital: Tier 1 and Tier 2 which together form Total regulatory capital. Tier 1 (going-concern capital) further consists of: i) Common equity ratio that includes mainly issued commons shares, retained earnings and additional Tier 1 capital which includes instruments that are "subordinated, have fully discretionary non-cumulative dividends or coupons and have neither a maturity date nor an incentive to redeem" (BCBS, 2010, p.2); and ii) Additional Tier 1 capital that encompasses further elements of bank capital as defi ned by BCBS (2011b). Tier 2 capital (gone-concern capital) includes chiefl y subordinated debt and certain loan loss provisions. First, in order to achieve a high quality capital base the following capital ratios were introduced in Basel III or their values were raised compared to Basel II: i) Minimum common equity (as a percentage of risk-weighted assets, "RWA") -an increase from 2% to 4.5%.
ii) Minimum Tier 1 capital as a percentage of RWA -an increase from 4% to 6%.
iii) Minimum total capital (including both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) as a percentage of RWA -the same level of 8%.
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Second, a capital conservation buffer rule has been introduced to refl ect the procyclical behaviour of banks beginning in 2016. During fairly stable times, a capital conservation buffer up to 2.5% of common equity must be held on top of the minimum capital requirements. In times of fi nancial stress, banks can use the buffer unless they make earnings distributions such as bonuses and dividends (BCBS, 2011a).
Third, BCBS (2011b) imposes for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs 4 ) additional loss absorbency requirements ranging from 1% to 2.5% of common equity depending on a bank's systemic importance. This should discourage banks from becoming even more systemically important and lower negative externalities of SIFIs. The higher loss absorbency requirements will be introduced in parallel with the Basel III capital conservation and countercyclical buffers, i.e. between 1 January 2016 and year end 2018, becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019. Figure 1 summarizes the structure of bank capital after full implementation of Basel III for both normal banks and SIFIs. Not surprisingly, regulatory efforts on higher capital requirements will affect bank performance negatively. For example, it is estimated that the current regulatory efforts will decrease overall global bank profi tability measured by return on average equity Common Equity 7.0 -9.5%
Normal Banks SIFIs
(2012) estimates that Basel III rules will diminish ROAE in banking sectors in France, Germany and the UK by 2.9, 2.8 and 2.1 percentage points in the future, respectively.
There are numerous views regarding the impact of the proposed capital requirements on bank deleveraging and the subsequent consequences on economies. In theory, one can distinguish three main ways of bank deleveraging: capital increase, reducing (risk-weighted) assets and restricting lending (Wehinger, 2012) . First, capital increase is sometimes called 'good deleveraging' since it occurs on banks´ liabilities via building capital and therefore comes at the costs of shareholders. However, due to a bleak economic outlook in the Eurozone and improper valuation of many 'zombie banks' 5 , neither new nor current shareholders of these banks are willing to provide additional funding. Second, bankers might reduce required capital requirements through decreasing risk-weighted assets via sales of assets or their 'reshuffl ing', which seems problematic under the current unfavourable conditions in the Eurozone. Finally, deleveraging might occur through restricting lending of banks sometimes called 'bad deleveraging' because of its negative impact on the economic output via either higher interest rates charged by banks or via asset contraction resulted in credit crunch. As a result of the deleveraging and other regulatory efforts, we expect a rise in shadow banking activities in the Eurozone in the near future.
Implementation of new banking regulation in Europe
The implementation of the new banking regulations will have some specifi c characteristics in Europe. First, the European Union (EU) will implement Basel III rules according to the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) published by European Commission in July 2011. Second, the EU needs to make capital requirements for its banks even stricter as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis spreading across the Eurozone. Both regulations are analysed below in more detail.
5 See Onaran (2011) for more details. We defi ne a zombie bank as a fi nancial institution with i) a price-to-book value ratio smaller than 1, ii) a negative economic worth, iii) mispriced assets and iv) support by government´ bail-outs and guarantees. Zombie banks include, for example, Allied Irish Banks, Bank of AMerica, Crédit Immobilier de France, German Landesbanken, Spanish Cajas or Royal Bank of Scotland that should have bankrupted rather than have been rescued for political reasons. Many zombie banks are still present in Japan, what gives a negative example to follow as these banks do not provide lending to the economy and therefore do not fulfi l their basic function. We expect that a similar situation will occur in the Eurozone and that the zombie banks will hamper economic recovery in coming years.
PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 2, 2014  149 
Capital Requirements Directive IV
CRD IV implements Basel III for more than 8,300 banks that operate in the EU (representing about 50% of the world's global banking assets). On the top of the rules required by Basel III, it introduces a number of additional changes to the banking regulatory framework. Moreover, while Basel III rules apply only to "internationally active banks", CRD IV ensures their application to all banks as well as investment fi rms in the EU. CRD IV is composed of two parts: (i) Directive that contains additional rules complementing Basel III about deposit-taking activities; and (ii) Regulation that provides detailed prudential requirements for fi nancial institutions. The specifi c of CRD IV is an introduction of a "single rule book" that should help to avoid the danger of divergent national rules, secure harmonization in fi nancial regulation across nations and contribute to a more effective functioning of the Single Market (European Commission, 2011). Table 1 summarizes key features of CRD IV from several points of view.
Stricter capital requirements for European banks
As a reaction to the potential negative outcomes of the sovereign debt crisis, in December 2011 the EBA published a formal "Recommendation" related to European banks' recapitalization needs. This Recommendation is a part of a broader European package agreed by the European Council and ECOFIN Council that is supposed to address the current situation in the EU (the whole EU not only Eurozone) by restoring stability and confi dence in banks and fi nancial markets. The new European agreed rules are stricter than global Basel III rules.
The EBA (2011a) rules require that banks to establish and keep an exceptional and temporary buffer such that the Core Tier 1 capital reaches a level of 9% by the end of June 2012 (in comparison with Tier 1 capital ratio of 6 % under Basel III). During stress testing, the EBA identifi ed a EUR 115 billion shortfall of a Tier 1 capital for 37 European banks. Nevertheless, these estimates seem rather underestimated as opposed by Open Europe (2011) that estimated a capital shortfall of EUR 260-372 billion for European banks, which is closer to reality taking into consideration the pending problems of banks on the Eurozone's periphery, such as Greece or Spain. We agree with Eichengreen (2014) stating that the European Banking Union (EBU) is deeply fl awed. 6 We assume that results of the Asset Quality Review (AQR) to be undertaken by the ECB will be biased and its outcome will be negative either for some EU governments or for the ECB. If the AQR is done properly, zombie banks will be revealed but not all EU governments will have enough money for their bailouts. If not done properly, zombie banks will fail later and the ECB will lose its reputation. We consider the EBU as the Trojan Horse of EU integration rather an effective tool for rescuing both EU banks and the Eurozone in the long-term.
Despite the fact that different banks will react differently to the above-mentioned capital shortfalls, the following mix of strategies might be expected: retention of future earnings, equity issuance, and reducing RWAs. Fitch (2012) estimates that an average bank out of analysed 29 G-SIFIs could meet its estimated shortfall of USD 19.5 billion to satisfy the 10% Basel III capital ratio through one year of retained earnings (USD 6 billion), new equity issuance (USD 6 billion) and fi nally through RWA reduction resulted in 6 See European Commission (2014) for more details on the EBU and the AQR.  151 USD 7.5 billion capital surplus. When considering problems of the Eurozone banks, capital increase via retained earnings and additional equity issuance will be limited. As a consequence, the Eurozone banks are supposed to react to higher CRD IV capital requirements primarily through asset contraction (credit crunch). We believe that this deleveraging together with further regulatory rules under Basel III and the existence of zombie banks will hinder rather than spur economic recovery in the Eurozone in the short-term. To support our argumentation, we mention IMF (2012) that estimated an approximately 2% negative impact on the Eurozone GDP by the end of 2013 (in the worst case scenario of poorly managed deleveraging bone by the banks).
Theoretical Background of the Model
In this section we present a theoretical background to our empirical analysis. The goal of the empirical analysis is to provide an answer to the question "What is the potential impact of strengthened capital requirements on banks' value in the EU?" Even though this question is relevant and interesting, it is not so frequently acknowledged in the connection with discussing the potential effects of the capital regulations. Whether the impact of increased capital levels will be positive or negative, both scenarios are justifi able. If the bank's value decreases as a result of holding more capital, this is because the market reacts negatively to a decreased level of bank's profi tability. In case of a positive reaction refl ected into a higher market value, investors appreciate decreased bank risk (as the aim of Basel III is to make banks "more healthy and safe" we will test the hypothesis whether higher capital requirements will be a positive signal for the equity markets). Further in this section, we fi rst present a literature review of key works dealing with banks' value-capital relationship; and second, we present construction of the model based on standard methodologies applied in panel data analysis: the fi xed effects and random effects methodologies.
Literature review
There exist three different points of view (leading to different results) about the relationship between the level of held capital and a bank's value. First, there is a generally known theorem of Modigliani and Miller developed as early as in 1958 stating that "the market value of any fi rm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate appropriate to its class" (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, p. 268) . Even though some authors claim that the principle of fi nancial intermediation creates informational and other types of frictions, so this principle does not apply to banks, as Miller (1995) expressed his insistence on his original indifference theorem.
Second, the academics in the 1970s pioneered the fi nding that if the capital ratio is increased via issuing new equity, the relationship between the capital level and the market value of a bank is negative (Ross, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984) . The rationale behind this is built on four pillars: (i) a downward sloping demand curve for a given company shares, (ii) a negative perception of issuing equity by rational investors 7 , (iii) loosing part of advantageous tax effects and debt-related transparency of information effects, and (iv) large transaction costs associated with equity issuance with potential negative effect on company's operation. Typical representatives of literature dealing empirically with this issue are Masulis and Korwar (1985) , who found a negative stock price change after secondary offerings for both industrials and services providing fi rms.
Third, there exists a channel of literature that directly quantifi es the relation between the level of required capital and the bank's value (which we also analyse in this study), while the majority of studies belonging to this channel fi nd a positive relation. Valkanov and Kleimeier (2007) investigated the role of regulatory capital in bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the USA and Europe and found that capital is perceived valuable by banks' buyers. They took the excess of regulatory capital as a key variable and identifi ed that high excess-capital targets are valued more by the market than their less capitalized counterparts. The theoretical model verifi ed by empirical data on bank M&A presented by Mehran and Thakor (2009) showed that the cross-section of banks' value is increasing in capital, no matter how the value is measured. Specifi cally, they found that the total bank value and its components (purchase price, goodwill, and net present value to shareholders) are all increasing in the equity capital of the acquired bank. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other research or study taking a closer look at the immediate impact of the regulatory obligation for banks to increase their capital ratios on their value. Table 3 in Section 4 provides an overview of existing fi ndings (including additional relevant studies to those discussed above) and compares it with our results.
The model
To estimate the effect of capital levels on European bank value, we use a panel data model in which the bank value is represented by its market capitalization. The suitability of market capitalization as a fi gure representing the bank value is obvious because this fi gure is generally accepted by the investment community to determine the bank's actual value. ln Assets i,t Natural logarithm of total assets used to control for the size effect
Empirical Analysis
In this empirical part we have applied two standard methodologies commonly used in panel data analysis: the fi xed effect methodology (for more details see Laird and Ware (1982) or Fitzmaurice et al. (2004) ) and random effects methodologies (for a detailed description we refer to works by Burnham et al. (2002) or Athanasoglou et al. (2006) ). The data for modelling were obtained from the BankScope database and cover the period of 2005-2011. The banks were selected according to their specialization and due to the nature of the models applied, only banks with "standard activities", such as deposits taking and loans providing, were involved in the modelling. These banks include commercial banks, bank holding companies, saving banks, mortgage banks and cooperative banks. The database provided complete required data on 172 European banks listed on European stock exchanges in the 2005-2011 period. The panel data model represented by Equation (1) was estimated using the fi xed effects methodology (FE) as it was diagnosed to be a more suitable model than the random effects for our data set measured by the Hausman specifi cation test. 8 It is important to note that we model the situation historically and base our conclusions about the potential future impact of Basel III capital adequacy rules on the assumption that the identifi ed behaviour will have a persistent character. This means that we assume that reactions of banks, banks-related variables and investors will respond to similar stimuli in the same way in the future as they did in the past. Table 2 reports results of the FE methodology including all three types of capital ratios. The results indicate that investors react negatively to higher levels of bank capital, which is refl ected into a negative reaction of banks' market capitalization performance 9 . In order to analyse the principles on which the whole system "valuecapital-profi tability-risk" was identifi ed to work, the estimated coeffi cients and their interconnectedness should be examined in more detail. The direct negative relationship between the level of held capital and a change in market capitalization is valid with statistical signifi cance for all three employed capital ratios. To put the results more specifi cally, an increase in common equity ratio, Tier 1 ratio and Total capital ratio by one percentage point in the past leads to a negative change in market capitalization of banks by 13.3%, 3.7% and 4.5%, respectively. 10 The positive relationship between bank profi tability and the change in market capitalization reported by our model confi rmed the market principle that investors are naturally willing to pay more for shares of better performing banks. This result corresponds to reality because current regulatory efforts will, as discussed above, decrease overall global banks' profi tability measured by return on average equity (ROAE) from 15-20% in the 2004-2007 pre-crisis period to estimated 10-14% after the year of 2013 (McKinsey, 2012; Oliver Wyman and Morgan Stanley, 2012; PWC, 2012) .
In addition, based on the values of estimated coeffi cients, the level of profi tability is considered to be a more important factor infl uencing buying/selling decisions of investors than the level of risk. This is because of the following reasons: (i) the relation between risk and a change in the market value was identifi ed to be positive (but insignifi cant), which means that investors do not tend to punish banks for undertaking more risky projects as they are expected to bring higher returns, (ii) the relationship between the quality of loans (proxied by non-performing loans) and the change in market capitalization showed to be positive, which adds to point (i) that investors are not afraid of buying shares of more risky banks. 8 Detailed results of appropriate tests are shown in Appendix.
9
As already mentioned above, we believe that including the performance of market capitalization is the best indicator for the studied relationship as it also captures the return to investors. However, during the modelling we checked also for a relationship between the absolute value of market capitalization and capital ratios and it showed to be negative, as well.
10 In the equation, the dependant variable is in natural logarithm, therefore, we interpret the coeffi cients in percentages (Wooldridge, 2009 Turning attention to other included variables, all coeffi cient reporting signifi cant results are in accordance with trading principles, i.e. dividend per share, price to book ratio and stock market index performance pull the change in market capitalization in a positive direction.
Summary of results
To summarize, investors do not appreciate higher capital ratios when deciding which shares to purchase in spite of the fact that the higher the level of capital, the lower the risk of banks. The level of profi tability that is decreased by keeping more capital 11 is a cardinal decision factor in our model and signifi cantly positively infl uences the value of a bank. Therefore, both of these characteristics describing investors' decision taking lead to a negative relationship between the performance of banks' shares and a past change in capital ratios, which, in principle, corresponds to the fi ndings of Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1985) , a detailed comparison with other authors is included in Table 3 . Our results and discussion connote that we have to reject our tested hypothesis expecting a positive impact of higher capital requirements on the market value of banks, because investors are expected to appreciate mainly the lower risk taking and less risky balance sheets of banks. Despite the conclusions mentioned above, there are still several ways in which our research can be improved. First, a similar study can be done on a larger sample of data including banks from a broader geographic area (we used the data from 172 banks in the EU). Second, the research focused on the impact of Basel III on the level of capital and the value of EU banks, while other consequences of Basel III might be researched, such as the impact on EU banks' lending rates, profi tability and risk adjustment decisions). Finally, further quantitative and especially qualitative factors should be examined as we employed only bank specifi c variables in our analysis. Other variables, such as macroeconomic conditions, factors infl uencing individual investor behaviour or a bank's future strategic development, are also perceived by investors and can infl uence the value of banks. Additionally, the banking sector reacts dynamically to internal and external conditions so naturally, the new regulatory framework will affect the banking industry in other several ways. For example, McKinsey (2011) presents three key implications of the regulation for the European retail banking industry: i) repricing banking products, ii) business-model changes (including adjustment of the product and service mix, a review of the geographical and legal structure, and a possible exit from non-profi table business activities), and fi nally iii) need to develop strategic agenda of a bank in terms of its scale, regional footprint and risk.
Conclusion
This paper deals with both the theoretical and the practical aspects of the new banking regulations in the European Union. In the theoretical part, we discussed both positives and negatives of fi nancial markets regulation and conclude that effective regulation (i.e. its benefi ts are higher than its costs) is a "mission impossible" as highlighted by Acharya et al. (2010) . Moreover, we focus on the Basel III banking regulation with a primary aim to strengthen global capital, liquidity and risk assessment rules and so to ensure higher resiliency of a banking sector. We agree with Teplý et al. (2012) who state the Basel III regulation is not suffi cient and will not prevent fi nancial markets from future crises due to its expected calibration, delayed implementation and strong pressure from the bank lobbyists. We also discussed two main banking regulations being currently applied across the European Union: CRD IV and higher capital requirements set by the EBA (2010). As a consequence of 'bad deleveraging', the Eurozone banks are supposed to react on higher capital requirements primarily through asset contraction. We believe that this deleveraging, together with further regulatory rules under Basel III and the existence of zombie banks, will hinder rather than support economic recovery in the Eurozone in the short-term, as documented by slow economic growth of the Eurozone as of May 2014.
Against this theoretical backdrop, we provided an empirical test of the hypothesis whether the market would appreciate positively higher capital requirements, lower risk taking and less risky balance sheets of banks under the Basel III proposal. Our analysis employs fi xed effects and methodology on fi nancial data on 172 banks listed on European stock exchanges during the 2005-2011 period. We found out that an increase in common equity ratio, Tier 1 ratio and Total capital ratio by one percentage point in the past leads to a negative change in market capitalization of banks by 13.3%, 3.7% and 4.5% respectively. As a result, we reject the hypothesis defi ned in the beginning of this work stating that higher capital requirements can be positively appreciated by the market. Consequently, based on our fi ndings we conclude that the impact of the Basel III regulation on the value of bank shares will probably be perceived negatively by the market, which could be refl ected in a drop in the market value of the shares of the observed banks.
